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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: A Study Regarding Berlin Prepared in Response  
to NSC Directive No. 58 of June 30, 1961

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin has prepared a report in response to the NSC Directive of June 30, 1961 (National Security Action Memorandum #58). This report is not an attempt to evaluate the merits of the courses of action described in the various attached papers. It is rather an effort to describe the courses of action in sufficient detail to permit judgments to be made concerning them. A discussion of the decisions required to carry out these courses of action follows immediately.

The report itself is organized into a summary of the development of the courses of action through the projected crisis period, which summarizes the integrated timetable, followed by these annexes:

- Annex A - Integrated timetable of actions.
- Annex B - A detailed examination of military preparations.
- Annex C - Permanent increase in U.S. military strength (not yet available).
- Annex D - OCDM submission.
- Annex E - A detailed examination of the covert actions.
- Annex F - A detailed description of the economic counter-measures.
- Annex G - An analysis of the effect of the courses of action on the United States economy and balance of payments.
- Annex H - A detailed examination of the public information aspects.
- Annex I - Preliminary considerations on the timing and nature of negotiations on Berlin.
- Annex J - Considerations affecting Western attitude toward East German personnel on access routes (checkpoint procedures).

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IMMINENT DECISIONS

This section deals with the decisions that will need to be taken soon, in order to launch the courses of action described in this report.

Underlying these specific decisions, of course, is a more fundamental one: whether the broad courses of action indicated in this paper should be accepted as a basis for our approach to the Berlin problem.

1. Military Preparations. A decision will be needed as to whether, and in what degree, a progressive mobilization of US resources and manpower should now be undertaken.

The arguments in favor of early large-scale mobilization are: (i) It might deter the Communists from blocking our access. (ii) It would make it possible to carry out the proposed military ground response to the blocking of allied access promptly after blocking; the four months needed to call up, train, and deploy units from the reserve components could be completed by 15 December, if they were started now. (iii) It could result in an improvement of the free world's military posture, which would be valuable regardless of how the Berlin crisis turned out. (iv) It would give us a head start in seeking to gain a more favorable ratio of forces in the event that the Soviets, with greater ready reserves but lesser over-all capacity, tried to out-mobilize us.

The arguments against early large-scale mobilization are: (i) It might engage the Soviets' prestige and thus make it more difficult for them to abandon their threats to block our access. (ii) It could frighten off US allies, who might consider that it would prevent a strategy of diplomatic maneuver; resulting allied disunity might encourage the Soviets to proceed with pressure against Berlin. (iii) It might not be necessary, since the Berlin stockpile, supplemented by an airlift, could keep Berlin going for a sufficient period to inaugurate preparations for ground combat after our access had been blocked, (even though the resulting capability would, of course, be less than if preparations were started now and continued for four months after access was blocked). (iv) It might trigger psychological fears of war and shortages in the US which could lead to inflation and thus require controls on the economy.

The choice need not, of course, be between black and white alternatives; it might be one of degree. Some kinds of early preparations will be necessary and may be helpful as a deterrent, even if it is decided to have a period of several months' final preparations

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after blocking of our access before proceeding to ground action, and even if it is concluded that large-scale and dramatic preparations would be counter-productive in their effect on Soviet intentions.

In any event, the choice should be based on a systematic analysis of the political and military implications of alternative levels of early mobilization and of the concomitant actions which we would like our Allies to undertake and their probable reactions. The attached paper was put together so quickly that no time was available for the Departments of State and Defense to prepare such an analysis.

One specific point to be covered in any decision on military preparations is whether now to request an additional \$3-5 billion for the DOD FY 62 budget, before the Senate Appropriations Committee passes on that budget. It might well be desirable to do this, even if it is decided not to initiate immediate large-scale mobilization. This increase could be presented to the public as our response to the over-all world situation, rather than to an acute Berlin crisis - both to minimize the psychological impact on the US economy referred to in the Treasury-CEA submission and to avoid seeming to dramatize an ostensible challenge to the Soviets over Berlin.

2. The DOD Budget. The NSC June 30 Directive called on the Secretary of Defense to submit recommendations concerning the magnitude and character of a permanent long-term increase in the size of the US defense establishment (i) which might be planned now in addition to any preparations to enhance specific Western capabilities for fighting over Berlin; and (ii) which might be executed, if and when Soviet actions regarding Berlin (e.g., blocking of access and resisting Allied forces) seemed to foreshadow a long period of greatly heightened world tensions. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State were also asked to submit recommendations concerning actions that might be taken to bring the prospect of this planned increase to the Soviets' attention .

The object of this course of action would be to deter Soviet pressures on Berlin, by convincing the USSR that such pressures could lead to a lasting step-up in US defense expenditures, such as followed the Korean War. (Since that step-up would not be begun until late in the crisis, it would probably not take effect in time to improve our fighting capabilities for dealing with that crisis.)

The DOD response to this part of the Directive was still in preparation when this report was assembled. Defense representatives at the 13 July meeting hope to be able to present proposals.

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The concept of planning a post-Berlin permanent increase in the DOD budget is believed sound. The magnitude and character of that increase can be resolved as soon as the DOD submission is at hand; further questions of Congressional consultation can then be considered.

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In principle, this seems sound. The real questions arise in connection with scale and timing.

It is suggested that the basic course of action be approved, subject to continuing decisions by the Secretary of State as to scale and timing.

4. Defense Mobilization and Civil Defense Measures. An Annex to this report includes recommendations on defense mobilization and civil defense. These recommendations will need to be coordinated with the Department of Defense before decisions on them can be taken.

5. Economic Countermeasures. No new decisions are now required. Inter-Allied planning for economic pressures on the Bloc is well under-way. If and as this planning generates need for Presidential decisions, these decisions will be sought.

6. US Economic Dislocations. If early, large-scale, and dramatic military preparations are to be undertaken, fears of war and prospective shortages could lead to hoarding, scare buying, and price increases in the absence of controls. If the program is a gradual and modest build-up not specifically keyed to the Berlin crisis, on the other hand, no severe inflationary problem may arise. Decisions about economic controls should thus be postponed until it has been decided on what scale military preparations are to go forward.

7. Public Information. An Annex to this report outlines a proposed public information program. One specific component of this program calls for decision: the proposal for an early Presidential speech, to be made shortly after publication of the US reply to the Soviet aide-memoire. No further decision seems needed to launch this information program; the USIA and the Department of State should do so immediately.

8. Negotiations. An Annex to this report outlines possible alternative U.S. negotiating positions. Decisions on these alternatives

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can be postponed until serious negotiations seem more imminent than they do now. Indeed, it would be undesirable to freeze our negotiating position this early in the game.

9. Western Attitude Toward East German Personnel Along the Access Routes. The issue here is whether the Western Powers should allow the East Germans to carry out the same procedures regarding access as the Soviets now do, as recommended by Mr. Acheson, or whether the existing contingency plans should be maintained providing for the introduction of a new procedure, when the Soviets leave the check-points, which is less favorable to the East Germans. The arguments pro and con are summarized in Annex J. Further staff work would not seem to be useful; an early decision is required, since the British are pressing for clarification of our position on this point.

10. Other Issues. Three issues are not dealt with in this report:

- (a) The Allied Reaction. This can more usefully be considered as part of our attempt to resolve the specific issues indicated above than as a separate subject in itself.
- (b) UN. The timing and manner of possible UN involvement in the Berlin crisis will need to be studied further by the Department of State.
- (c) Congressional Consultation. This should be considered after decisions have been made on the specific items outlined above.

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SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURSES OF ACTION

A. For purposes of planning, the course of action has been projected from July 17 until January 1. This period has been divided into three phases. Each phase corresponds to a predicted development in pursuit by the Soviet Union of its present policy. Needless to say, rigid schemata of this kind seldom if ever work out with great precision in practice, regardless of how necessary they may be for the planning of a complex and inter-related program of action; the intrusion of unpredictable events is always a certainty. (In the present case, for example, it is quite likely that the issue will be taken to the UN by one nation or another if the crisis develops very far.) Moreover, if Western policy is successful the crisis will not develop through all three phases but will be arrested before that occurs. On the other hand, early stages may last longer than the schedule indicates and subsequent stages would accordingly occur later than now scheduled. For planning purposes, the dates marking transitions from phase to phase are the earliest dates on which it can be assumed the transition would ever occur.

B. The three phases are as follows:

Phase I - From now until the period during which we would anticipate a call for a "peace conference" on the part of the Soviet Union. This might come any time after the German elections on September 17, though it is probably more likely to be related in timing to the Communist Party Congress in mid-October. For purposes of planning, however, we should consider September 17 as the end of Phase I.

During this period the West must demonstrate clearly its determination to defend its vital interests at all costs. It must also set in motion a program of military and civil defense preparedness which will put it in position to undertake military action shortly after the end of Phase III if the crisis should develop through all phases and military action should prove necessary. Simultaneously it must prepare the way for use in later stages of severe measures of economic warfare on a NATO-wide basis. Initial measures should be taken, and plans laid, for psychological warfare.

At the same time the West must make every effort to obtain the support of world opinion for its basic position on Berlin and Germany and to prepare the ground for whatever negotiating stance it might wish later to adopt. The point at which negotiations with the Soviets might occur, or the manner in which they would be brought about, is impossible to state with certainty. It is assumed the West would not wish to negotiate until its preparedness had reached sufficient proportions to alter Soviet estimates of

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our determination. On the other hand, if negotiations are to occur and prove fruitful the positions of the two sides should not have hardened irreparably. Thus Phase I must be a period of flexibility. Military and propaganda measures should not be such as to challenge and provoke the Soviets. They should be principally designed to induce Soviet willingness to compromise.

Toward the end of this period the West should be in somewhat better position to negotiate, if that appeared necessary or desirable at that time, although negotiations coming in this phase would likely be principally of public relations significance. In addition, we should be in a position to move rapidly forward with more vigorous measures of military preparedness and with various forms of non-military pressure if the crisis moves into Phase II.

Phase II - From September 17 until the "peace treaty" would be signed. The final date is difficult to establish beyond the fact that it would likely be this year. December 1 would be a useful date for planning purposes.

We should be prepared to move into this phase by September 17 but we would probably not wish to do so until the Soviet Union actually made an additional move in the direction of a "peace conference". The phase would be characterized by increased pace and scope of overt preparation. The need for retention of flexibility would be somewhat reduced, but it would still be present since negotiations, if they have not yet occurred, are likely to take place in this phase. Toward the end of the phase, if we have reason to believe the Soviet estimate of our seriousness of purpose has altered, it might prove desirable to encourage by indirection the initiation of negotiations. While large-scale economic counter-measures would not be instituted in this phase, overt indications of our intention to take them at a later stage should be given. Meanwhile, economic counter-measures of lesser scale and intensity would gradually be introduced.

Phase III - From the signing of the "peace treaty", assumed to be December 1, until the Soviet Union actually turned over control of Berlin access to the GDR. Here again there can be precision in the assignment of dates. However, the period could not be expected to be longer than a month.

If the crisis develops as far as this phase, the USSR will have signed a "peace treaty". Our assumptions concerning Soviet intentions will have to be weighted more heavily on the side of their pursuing their policies to the point of a showdown on access to Berlin. Our military preparations will have to be pressed rapidly to completion, including evacuation of dependents,

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etc. Our propaganda will have to concentrate more directly on the question of access so that military action on our part, if it should prove necessary, would to the extent possible appear logical and justified. Psychological warfare should be stepped up to the point that this factor becomes of real concern to the Soviets in determining their next moves. Preparations for large-scale economic counter-measures should be made so evident that their implementation upon any interference with our access can be assumed by the Soviet Bloc to be virtually automatic.

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INTEGRATED TIMETABLE

NOTES

1. The timetable of military actions in phase one has been divided into two-week periods, since greater precision has been possible here than in other fields where it is generally desired that actions begin as soon as possible in the phase. Domestic economic controls are an exception to the last point, since it is considered that they should await a decision on the level of military buildup.
2. The listing of military items has been based on a preliminary Defense draft and may require revision in the light of any changes which may appear in the final Defense contribution. Moreover, Defense recommendations as to the magnitude and character of a permanent increase in the size of the United States defense establishment have not been received in time for incorporation in this timetable.
3. Global countermeasures of a military nature are listed in Annex B but in the absence of a detailed study no attempt has been made to include them in the timetable.
4. With the exceptions noted, the timetable provides a comprehensive listing of possible measures. No attempt has been made therein to distinguish between those items which are indispensable to the basic courses of action involved and those which could be dropped without necessarily prejudicing the courses of action.

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PHASE I

Military Measures* OCDM Measures**	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
<p>(Action in Defense unless otherwise noted)</p> <p><u>July 15-31, 1961</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Increase in draft calls.</li><li>2. Expansion of military and industrial production base.</li><li>3. Increase in rates of production of non-nuclear ammunition and selected supplies and equipment.</li><li>4. Commencement of pre-stocking of essential non-nuclear weapons and supplies in Europe.</li><li>5. Preparation to conduct naval and air harassment measures.</li></ol> <p>* The elements relating to buildup of military strength in this timetable are based on the goal of applying the six-division plan in Europe.</p> <p>** Annex D includes recommendations on civil defense and defense mobilization. These recommendations will need to be coordinated with the Department of Defense before any decisions on them can be taken. They have therefore not been included in the timetable.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Political - Visit by the President or the Secretary to NATO and key European capitals to urge full support for our position and our policies. (Action - White House, State)</li><li>2. [REDACTED]</li><li>3. [REDACTED]</li><li>4. [REDACTED]</li></ol>	<p><u>Countermeasures</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Consultation with NATO and subsequent planning and initial preparations by NATO countries to establish necessary authority and administrative capability for implementation of economic countermeasures. (Action - State)</li><li>2. Designation of a State-Commerce-Treasury working group to draw up detailed plans, including requirements, necessary for accelerated U.S. implementation of economic countermeasures. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury)</li></ol> <p><u>Domestic Economy*</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Request for Congressional authorization for the President to institute a temporary freeze on all wages, salaries, prices and rents, pending passage of more detailed legislation. *The controls described here are designed to deal with the situation which would result from an early, dramatic and large-scale military buildup.</li></ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. A Presidential report to the nation, possibly in the form of a televised address to a joint session of Congress, outlining the nature of the crisis and presenting a persuasive statement of Western policy. This should presumably come shortly after the publication of our reply to the June 4 Aide Memoire. (Action - White House, State)</li><li>2. Provision of briefing materials to U.S. Mission Chiefs abroad, supplemented from time to time as appropriate, to enable them to keep key officials of foreign governments apprised of our position (Action - State, USIA)</li><li>3. Coordination of our information activities closely with those of the UK, France and Germany, possibly with an initial quadripartite meeting of information experts. (Action - State, USIA)</li><li>4. Approaches to other NATO members through our NATO Mission to urge them to promote the Western position through their own information media programs and through their overseas posts. (Action - State)</li></ol>

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Military Measures COM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
<p>6. Review of readiness status of all STRAC units and supporting units together with appropriate sea and air support, and the ensuring of a capability for early deployment.</p> <p>7. Steps to ensure an improved ability to deploy forces rapidly to Europe by MSTS, CMAF, and MSTIS.</p> <p>8. Preparation for utilization of aircraft at wartime rates.</p> <p>9. Initiation of measures to increase readiness of U.S. and Allied forces in Europe to include continued efforts to complete tripartite planning tasks.</p> <p>10. Increase in combat readiness of selected reserves preparatory to call-up.</p> <p>11. Initiation of measures to increase readiness for general war.</p>	<p>5. [REDACTED]</p> <p>6. Political - August 1 - Declaration of limited national emergency. (Action - Defense and other agencies)</p> <p>7. [REDACTED]</p> <p>8. [REDACTED]</p>	<p>2. Request for Congressional authorization for comprehensive price, rent, wage and salary controls, consumer credit and real estate credit controls, settlement of labor disputes, requisitioning and general voluntary credit restraints. (Action - Treasury, CEA)</p> <p>3. Request for Congressional grant of discretionary authority to the President to sell excess materials from strategic stockpiles for counterspeculative purposes. (Action - Treasury, CEA)</p> <p>4. Request for Congressional authority for the President to meet shifting revenue and economic stabilization needs by raising or lowering the first-bracket personal income tax rate within 5 percentage points of its statutory level. (Action-Treasury, CEA)</p> <p>5. Consultation with other governments concerning movements of capital from one national currency to another or from currencies to gold that may arise out of anxieties about the international political situation, with a view either to preventing such movements or to offsetting their effects on the foreign exchanges. (Action -Treasury, CEA)</p>	<p>5. Preparation for earliest possible issuance of a background pamphlet on Berlin. Eventual translation into foreign languages for distribution abroad. Action has been begun. (Action - State)</p> <p>6. Publication of feature articles on Berlin in newspapers and periodicals. (Action - State, USIA)</p> <p>7. Expansion of public speaking program by Department and Foreign Service Officers. (Action - State)</p> <p>8. Institution of a program of periodic conferences to provide background briefing for U.S. news media, representatives of influential non-governmental organizations etc. (Action - State, USIA)</p> <p>9. Provision of background material to CENTO, SEATO and the OAS. (Action - State)</p> <p>10. Provision of background material to Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. (Action - State)</p> <p>11. Program of West German - sponsored visits of foreign journalists to West Berlin. (Action -State)</p>

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PHASE I

Military Measures OCOM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
<p><u>August 1 - 15</u></p> <p>12. Begin filling up STRAF division forces to extent possible without calling up reserves (20,000 men).</p> <p>13. Stepping of dependent travel to Europe.</p> <p>14. Extension of enlistments, duty tours of draftees, and overseas tours.</p> <p>15. Begin building 7th Army up to TOE strength by adding 7,000 men.</p> <p><u>August 16 - 31</u></p> <p>16. Begin partial mobilization (assuming a limited national emergency had been declared about August 1)</p> <p>17. Movement of one division to Europe by air and sea as a training exercise, and return it in 30 or 60 days.</p> <p>18. Begin calling up 3 - 6 division forces, one per month.</p> <p>19. Begin calling up 21 ANG fighter squadrons.</p>		<p>6. Review of existing emergency powers to control outward movements of funds and to protect the United States monetary gold stock. (Action - Treasury, CEA)</p> <p>7. Consultation with our allies concerning international machinery for assuring flows of basic material to their most important uses here and abroad and for counteracting speculative influences. (Action - Treasury, CEA)</p> <p>8. Establishment of a special legislative Task Force, chaired by a Presidential designee, to draft the stand-by legislation prescribed above. (Action - Treasury, CEA)</p> <p>9. Establishment of a Task Force to sharpen and perfect detailed preparation for an emergency economic stabilization program to be instituted coincident with a buildup of force for the Berlin crisis. (Action - Treasury, CEA)</p> <p>10. Development of plans for a new stabilization agency. (Action - Budget)</p>	

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
Military Measures OCDM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
<p>20. Begin naval augmentation of 121,900 men, 89 ships, and 23 ASW squadrons, if decision to undertake blockade has been made.</p> <p>21. Increase in amphibious lift capability (86 ships).</p> <p>22. Increase in SAC ground alert to 50 percent.</p> <p>23. Obtaining of SAC overflight rights from Spain. (Action - State, Defense)</p> <p>24. Arrangement for use of nuclear weapons from French bases. (Action - State, Defense)</p> <p><u>September 1 - 17</u></p> <p>25. Completion of filling up STRAF division forces.</p> <p>26. Deployment of 6 ANG fighter squadrons, 6 TAC squadrons to Europe.</p> <p>27. Retention of Demaldsen, MacDill, Chennault fields.</p> <p>28. Begin withdrawal of dependents and non-essential personnel from Europe.</p> <p>29. Deployment of 2 STRAC divisions to Europe.</p>		<p>11. Acceleration by the OCDM of preparedness to take emergency stabilization action for limited or general war. (Action - OCDM)</p>	

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PHASE II

Military Measures OCDM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
<p>1. Calling up of 6 ANG C-97 squadrons.</p> <p>2. Deployment of 4 divisions to Europe.</p> <p>3. Deployment of 12 fighter squadrons to Europe.</p> <p>4. Mobilization of COMAF.</p>	<p>1.</p> 	<p><u>Countermeasures</u></p> <p>1. Restrict economic negotiations with USSR to most essential matters (Action - State)</p> <p>2. Cancel arrangements for Soviet participation in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Western countries (NATO). (Action - State, Commerce)</p> <p>3. Cancel arrangements for Western (NATO) participations in exhibitions, trade fairs, scientific conferences, and other international meetings scheduled in Soviet bloc countries. (Action - State, Commerce)</p> <p>4. Undertake discussions at highest levels of government with NATO Powers re possibility of instituting total embargo (exports, imports, financial controls, etc.) against Soviet bloc. (Action - State)</p>	<p>Continue programs begun in Phase I.</p>

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PHASE II

Military Measures OCDM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
		<p>5. Interrupt official discussions of new credits for USSR and satellites, or terminate official credits and export credit guarantees, as appropriate, and other similar actions of such a nature as to convince Soviets NATO has every intention to introduce economic countermeasures. (Action - State)</p> <p>6. Arrange for slowdown in issuance of export licenses for shipments to Soviet bloc. (Action - Commerce)</p> <p><b>Domestic Program</b></p> <p>1. Statement to Chancellor Adenauer that the U.S. expects the Federal Republic to provide assistance to offset U.S. dollar expenditures in connection with additional deployment of forces. (This would occur following the German elections).</p>	

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PHASE III

Military Measures OCDM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
<p>1. Deployment of 6 transport squadrons to Europe.</p> <p>2. Institution of pacific blockade or naval blockade as necessary.</p> <p>3. Implementation of 6-division plan in Europe as necessary. (This could be done at any time after November 15).</p> <p>4. Expansion of mobilization, taking other military actions, as necessary.</p>	<p>1. [REDACTED]</p> <p>2. [REDACTED]</p> <p>3. [REDACTED]</p>	<p><u>Countermeasures</u></p> <p>1. Cut off selected types of industrial and technical exchanges in which Soviets are most interested and ban export of published and unpublished technical and scientific information. (Action - State, Commerce, AEC).</p> <p>2. Implement countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of tripartite controls over transport on basis equivalent to Soviet harassments. (Action - State, Defense)</p> <p>3. Initiate measures to prevent Soviet and satellite aircraft from making transit overflights and technical steps or, alternatively, to make overflying and technical steps difficult. (Action - State).</p> <p>4. Initiate measures to prevent Soviet and satellite aircraft from landing or exercising commercial rights at Western airports or, alternatively, to make such landings or exercise of commercial rights difficult. (Action - State).</p>	<p>Continue programs begun in Phase I.</p>

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PHASE III

Military Measures OCDM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
		<p>5. Bring action to repossess Soviet lend-lease ships in Allied ports. (Action - Justice).</p> <p>6. Initiate harassments concerning documentation, inspections, delay, or technical requirements of Soviet bloc shipping at Allied ports. (Action - Commerce, Treasury).</p> <p>7. Delay ship's servicing (bunkering, lightering, provisioning, naval stores) to Soviet bloc shipping. (Action - State, Commerce).</p> <p>8. Regulate movement of Soviet bloc vessels in Allied ports. (Action - Treasury).</p> <p>9. Refuse to enter into new contracts to charter shipping to Soviet bloc countries. (Action - Commerce).</p> <p>10. Refuse ship's servicing to Soviet bloc shipping. (Action - Commerce, Treasury).</p> <p>11. Initiate harassments similar to those described for Soviet bloc shipping for Soviet Zone of Germany and/or bloc rail and inland waterway traffic. (Action - State, Defense)</p>	

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Military Measures OCDM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermeasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
		<p>12. Expand export control measures against bloc, including selective embargo. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury, AEC).</p> <p>13. Harass Soviet trade missions, including Anterg offices. (Action - State, Commerce, Justice)</p> <p>14. Implement countermeasures against USSR and "GDR" in form of controls over transport. Measures to be taken here are those listed above to be applied against Soviet bloc shipping. At this stage the scope would be expanded from application by only the U.S., UK and France to application by NATO and other powers:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>a. Suspend existing contracts to charter shipping to Soviet bloc countries. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury).</li><li>b. Close Allied ports to Soviet bloc shipping. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury).</li><li>c. Forbid the calling at Soviet bloc ports of Allied vessels and planes. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury).</li></ul>	

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PHASE III

Military Measures OCOM Measures	Political Measures Covert Actions	Economic (countermasures and domestic measures)	Information Program
		<p>15. Terminate trade agreements involving Soviet bloc countries. (Action - State).</p> <p>16. Deny all exports to Soviet bloc countries. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury, AEC).</p> <p>17. Stop all Western imports from Soviet bloc countries. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury).</p> <p>18. Freeze or seize, as appropriate, all bloc assets under jurisdiction of NATO Powers. (Action - State, Treasury).</p> <p>19. Institute total trade embargo. Cut off all Western financial facilities to (prohibit current transactions with) USSR and other bloc members and their nationals. (Action - State, Commerce, Treasury).</p> <p>20. Expel Soviet technical experts and foreign trade officials without diplomatic immunity from NATO countries. (Action - State).</p> <p>21. Close Soviet trade missions, including Anterg offices. (Action - State, Commerce, Justice)</p>	

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